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PORNOGRAPHY, THE INTERNET, AND STUDENT-TO-
STUDENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT: A DILEMMA RESOLVED
WITH TITLE VII AND TITLE IX
EVELYN OLDENKAMP*
I.  INTRODUCTION
Today, a female student may walk into a university computer lab to further
her academic pursuits and find herself in a hostile environment because of  other
students’ use of the Internet.1 She may find a picture of a woman being raped on
the screen next to her, hear male students laughing as they joke about the “big
tits” of a naked woman on the computer screen, or be forced to wait at a printer
while a male student prints a picture of a naked woman in bondage. This envi-
ronment hinders female students’ academic performance.
I have witnessed some of this behavior myself. One day, I went to retrieve a
printout in the University of Oregon School of Law’s computer center and was
forced to wait while the printer slowly printed a full picture of a naked woman
gagged and bound to a chair. I have also been shocked by my female colleagues’
stories about male law students spending fifteen to thirty minutes doing nothing
but viewing pornography in the law school computer lab.
These incidents made me uncomfortable within an environment which is
essential to my academic pursuit, and they also indicated that some of my male
colleagues see me and other women as less than an equal or, at least, have no
qualms about engaging in behavior that many of their female colleagues per-
ceive as disrespectful of women. Initially, I distanced myself from the individu-
als who viewed the pornography and many of their friends. I avoided having
conversations with them. Feeling that their behavior showed disrespect for
women, I respected them less.
*  J.D. 1997, University of Oregon School of Law.
1. The Internet evolved from ARPANET, a reliable networking system under the auspices of
the Department of Defense, developed by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). See
JOHN R. LEVINE & CAROLE BAROUDI, THE INTERNET FOR DUMMIES 11 (1994). This network could sur-
vive attacks on one of its links by rerouting information. The reliability of ARPANET-type net-
working was demonstrated during the 1991 Gulf War. The primary reason the United States had
difficulty shutting down Iraqi command networks was Iraq’s use of the commercial networks de-
signed from the ARPANET. See id. at 12.
In 1980, university computing systems began to rely on UNIX operating software which
could be used to access the Internet. See id. at 13. Currently, most universities, colleges, and recently,
many high schools and elementary schools provide access to the Internet in their computer centers.
The benefits that have been created, unfortunately, also come with disadvantages. The Internet al-
lows students to access a wide variety of “sites.” These include pornographic materials provided by
both commercial enterprises and individual users.
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I have since changed my perspective, taking a more proactive stance. I now
presume that many of these men simply do not understand how their behavior
affects their female colleagues. Universities should also take proactive ap-
proaches to this behavior by developing policies to prevent the negative reper-
cussions it has on some of their students. Virginia Rezmierski, referring to por-
nography on the Internet, insightfully stated, “To ignore such acts is to enable
the disintegration of a community, to allow hostilities and misunderstandings to
increase, and to allow the disempowering of some individuals within the com-
munity at the expense for [sic] empowering others.”2
This article proposes that student use of the Internet within university
computer centers to view pornography should give rise to a per se hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment claim, and that such claims should be brought by
students against their peers under university conduct codes and disciplinary
procedures. 3
Part II discusses why student use of the Internet to view pornography
within a university presents a greater legal challenge than the same behavior by
students within elementary and secondary schools. Part II also discusses the case
law concerning obscenity and pornography leading to the creation of hostile en-
vironment sexual harassment claims under Title VII. Part III lays out the history
of Title VII, discussing the development of the hostile environment sexual har-
assment claim and the judicial construction of such a claim under Title IX. Part
IV proposes a legally sound means of dealing with hostile environment sexual
harassment claims within the university context. The article concludes with the
suggestion that the proposed policy is a legally valid and practical means of ef-
fectuating the purpose of Title IX.
This article focuses only on pornography that depicts women as sexual ob-
jects because studies suggest that the majority of the viewers of pornography on
the Internet are men.4 Therefore, assuming that homosexual male viewers are
not vastly disproportionately represented, the majority of pornography viewed
on the Internet depicts women. This focus also assumes that female students will
usually be the ones who find the display of pornography to create a hostile envi-
ronment because pornography primarily depicts women as sexual objects and
thus reminds women of their unequal status within society. However, the policy
proposed here will also allow male students to bring actions against peers who
view pornography on the Internet within common areas. Pornography would
include the display of men, women, or children in nude photos, when such
photos displayed sexual acts, sexually provocative poses, or otherwise were sex-
ual in nature. Thus, male or female students could bring actions against their
peers for the display of pornography.
2. Virginia Rezmierski, Computers, Pornography, and Conflicting Rights, 30 EDUCOM REV.,
Mar./Apr. 1995, No. 2, at 42, 44.
3. See generally David K. Mcgraw, Sexual Harassment in Cyberspace: The Problem of Unwelcome E-
Mail, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 491 (discussing the problem of sexual harassment via e-
mail and a proposed legal solution).
4. See Marty Rimm, Marketing Pornography on the Information SuperHighway: A Survey of
917,410 Images, Descriptions, Short Stories, and Animations Downloaded 8.5 Million Times by Consumers
in Over 2000 Cities in Forty Countries, Provinces and Territories, 83 GEO. L.J. 1849, 1904-05 (1995)
(discussing data that shows most viewers of pornography on the Internet are men).
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II.  PORNOGRAPHY AND THE INTERNET
A.  The Unique Problem of Pornography at Universities
Prohibiting student access to pornography at high schools and elementary
schools is not a difficult legal dilemma. The Supreme Court has recognized the
broad authority of states, school boards, and officials to control student conduct
within primary and secondary schools,5 including freedom of expression in
classrooms and school assemblies,6 as long as it is consistent with constitutional
safeguards.7 The minor student’s constitutional right to freedom of expression is
not coextensive with the adult’s right to freedom of expression.8 The school may
censor speech that disrupts classwork or school discipline, interferes with the
rights of other students,9 or “undermine[s] the school’s basic educational mis-
sion.”10
Schools may also censor speech occurring at activities considered part of
the school curriculum. This includes any faculty supervised activity designed to
impart knowledge or skills to the students.11 It also includes school sponsored
publications, assemblies,12 and other events. The Supreme Court will uphold
school regulations designed to ensure students learn the skills a curriculum of-
fers while protecting students from exposure to material which is inappropriate
for their level of maturity.13 The Supreme Court will not interfere with a school’s
regulations unless there is no valid educational purpose for such restriction of
student expression.14
A school’s computer resources can clearly be established as part of the
school curriculum and consequently are subject to school regulation. Pornogra-
phy can be inconsistent with a school’s basic educational mission and inappro-
priate for the students’ maturity level. The Supreme Court is therefore unlikely
to find a ban on pornography within elementary and secondary schools to be
unconstitutional.
However, in colleges and universities the situation is slightly more compli-
cated. College students for the most part are adults, and universities are places
for the unrestricted exchange of ideas, so a more complex legal dilemma exists in
5. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969). In this case
two high school students were suspended for wearing black armbands in protest of the Vietnam
War.
6. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
7. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507.
8. Although some people over 18 may attend secondary schools, the vast majority of students
are minors. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682.
9. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508 (noting that the rights of other students include “the rights . . . to
be secure and to be let alone.”).
10. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
11. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
12. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). The Supreme Court upheld
the school’s discipline of a student for delivering a “sexually explicit” speech at a school assembly,
even though the speech was not legally obscene. The school was justified in prohibiting vulgarity
“wholly inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of public school education.” Id. at 685-86.
13. See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 271.
14. See id. at 273.
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addressing student access of pornography at the university level. Academic
freedom allows students and faculty to interpret, explore, and expand existing
knowledge by challenging old ideas and proposing new ideas and theories, and
it is vigorously protected in the academic community.15 The Supreme Court has
indicated that universities are “peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas’” and has
proclaimed that “no new constitutional ground [is broken] in reaffirming this
Nation’s dedication to safeguarding academic freedom.”16 However, universities
also have the responsibility to ensure all students the freedom to learn17 and, un-
der Title IX, the duty to prevent gender-based discrimination.18
University students’ use of the Internet to view pornography in public sec-
tors creates a conflict between the free expression of ideas and each student’s
right to learn free from gender discrimination. Universities need to develop a
means of effectively balancing these two interests. 
B.  Pornography: Definition, Constitutional Standing, and Impact on Women
In Miller v. California,19 the United States Supreme Court defined the con-
stitutional standard for what is obscene and therefore subject to state restriction.
Works which “taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which
portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole,
do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value,” are obscene.20
A publication’s offensiveness is measured by the standards of the community
where it is distributed or published.21 The Supreme Court later noted that
“obscene” material must appeal to something other than “normal, healthy sex-
ual desires.”22
The constitutional definition of obscenity focuses on the “immorality” of a
publication.23 It defines as unacceptable only that which conflicts with estab-
lished community norms. Most pornography is not classified as obscene and has
been protected as freedom of expression.24 It apparently fits within the category
15. See Terrance Sandalow et al., A Preliminary Report: Freedom of Expression and Campus Har-
assment Codes, 77 ACADEME: BULL. OF THE AM. ASSOC. OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, May-June 1991, at 23-26.
16. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972), citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 603 (1967).
17. See James R. Kreuzer, A Student “Right” Examined, 53 AAUP BULL. 196-201 (1967).
18. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1994).
19. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
20. See id. at 24.
21. See id. at 30-34.
22. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 498 (1985).
23. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1, 21 (1985).
24. See American Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 330 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 475
U.S. 1001 (1986), (citing, Jenkins v. Georgia, 481 U.S. 153 (1974)) (finding the film Carnal Knowledge, a
film showing a woman groveling to please the sexual whims of a man, not obscene); see also id. at
333 (citing Erznonznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975)) (striking down a state ordinance
prohibiting showing films with nudity at a drive-in theater and concluding that exposure to sex is
not something the government may prevent).
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of “normal, healthy sexual desires.”25 These “healthy sexual desires” are often
offensive to women and detrimental to women’s health.26
In stark contrast to the Supreme Court’s definition of obscenity, Catharine
MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin defined pornography as “a systematic practice
of exploitation and subordination based on sex which differentially harms
women.”27 According to these authors, pornography harms women’s opportuni-
ties and rights by inducing men to view women with contempt.
Pornography is speech about women and sex which constructs a social re-
ality of women as sex objects.28 This perpetuates bigotry and justifies acts of ag-
gression against women.29 Pornography that appeals to “normal, healthy sexual
desire” is not perceived as “immoral,” therefore, it is not subject to government
regulation. Instead, it is defined and defended as a form of freedom of expres-
sion,  and  thereby, is  given  legal  protection  under  the  Constitution.30  As
Catharine MacKinnon noted, this legal protection focuses not upon the nature of
pornography, but upon its medium: books, photographs, films, videos, televi-
sion programs, and images in “cyberspace.” Thus, pornography becomes a part
of the “marketplace of life.”31 Pornography has “fallen into a reality warp” and
the detrimental impact which pornography has upon women is perpetuated un-
der the guise of “freedom of expression.”32 Evidence of the harmful effect which
pornography has on women has led some communities to enact legislation or
otherwise advocate for the restriction or banning of some pornography..33 How-
ever, community attempts to regulate pornography have been held to unconsti-
tutionally injure First Amendment rights of the pornographers.34
25. Brockett, 472 U.S. at 498.
26. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Vindication and Resistance: A Response to the Carnegie Mellon
Study of Pornography in Cyberspace, 83 GEO. L.J. 1959, 1959 n.1 (1995).
27. American Booksellers Ass’n, 771 F.2d at 329, quoting INDIANAPOLIS [SIC] CODE § 16-1(a)(2)
(1984).
28. See MacKinnon, supra note 23, at 19.
29. See id. at 45, 53-54:
[Because pornography] is reinforcing, [and leads to sexual release, it] leads men to want
the experience which they have in photographic fantasy to happen in “real”
life . . . . [Exposure to pornography] makes normal men more closely resemble convicted
rapists attitudinally, although as a group they don’t look all that different from them to
start with. It also significantly increases attitudinal measures known to correlate with rape
and self-reports of aggressive acts, measures such as hostility toward women, propensity
to rape, condoning rape, and predicting that one would rape or force sex on a woman if
one knew one would not get caught. This latter measure, by the way, begins with rape at
about a third of all men and moves to half with “forced sex.”
MacKinnon further notes that there is no experimental research to contrast these results. See id. at
55-56.
30. See American Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 333-34 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d,
475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
31. See MacKinnon, supra note 26, at 1961 (1995).
32. Id.
33. See MacKinnon, supra note 23, at 3 n.2 (discussing hearings held in Minneapolis, Minn. re-
garding proposed ordinances that would classify pornography as a form of discrimination against
women).
34. See American Booksellers Ass’n, 771 F.2d at 333-34.
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Because power in American society has traditionally been under male con-
trol,35 men have defined the norms of sexual desire. “[P]ower constructs the ap-
pearance of reality by silencing the voices of the powerless, by excluding them
from access to authoritative discourse.”36 Women are excluded from that dis-
course, and what they perceive as “norms” of sexual desire are not incorporated
in defining what is and is not constitutionally protected. 
The leading case concerning the regulation of pornography is American
Booksellers Association, Inc., v. Hudnut37 in which the Seventh Circuit struck down
as unconstitutional an Indianapolis statute which defined pornography as a
practice that discriminates against women.38 The court acknowledged that peo-
ple often act in accord with images and patterns they find around them and ac-
cepted the legislation’s premise that pornography perpetuates the subordination
of women and results in “lower pay at work, insult and injury at home, battery
and rape on the streets.”39 The court, however, noted that a direct link between
pornography and violent acts against women has never been conclusively estab-
lished. It acknowledged that because the socialization process has so many fac-
tors it is difficult to determine whether viewing pornography alone leads to vio-
lent acts.40 While sufficient evidence exists on both sides to create a valid
empirical dispute41 because the effects of pornography on male mentality are not
immediate, the court held that the state may not penalize pornography by al-
lowing civil actions against pornographers under Indianapolis’ definition of
pornography.42 
Regardless of federal courts’ views on pornography,  this paper adopts
Catharine MacKinnon’s conclusion that pornography essentially sexualizes so-
cietal inequality and institutionalizes the sexuality of male dominance thereby
violating women’s right to equal protection under the law.43 Pornography de-
fines how men see women. Furthermore, men’s power over women defines who
women can be within the societal hierarchy.44 Pornography perpetuates some
men’s view of women as non-equals at home, within the workplace, and within
the academic arena.
The display of pornography in the workplace has been held to contribute to
an actionable Title VII claim for hostile environment sexual harassment.45 Some
35. See MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, supra note 23, at 3-9.
36. Id. at 3.
37. 771 F.2d 323. (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
38. See id. at 333-34.
39. Id. at 329.
40. See id. at 330.
41. See, e.g., id. at 329 n.2. See generally ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING
WOMEN (1989).
42. See American Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 333 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 475
U.S. 1001 (1986) (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)).
43. See MacKinnon, supra note 23, at 8.
44. See id. at 17-18.
45. See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1472-81 (3d Cir. 1990). But see Rabidue
v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 622 (6th Cir. 1986) (finding that sexually oriented poster dis-
play had de minimis effect on plaintiff’s work environment when considered within a society that
condones, publicly features, and commercially exploits open displays of written and pictorial erotica
at the newsstands, on prime time television, at the cinema, and in other public places). The Supreme
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courts have limited the constitutional protection given to pornography dis-
played within common areas of the workplace. These courts have identified
pornography as an invidious means of perpetuating inequality within the work-
place.46 Pornography is restricted in these environments because of the effects it
has on women’s equality within the workplace. Pornography has the same
negative implications within the university community and should be similarly
circumscribed.
III.  TITLE VII: HISTORY, IMPACT ON PORNOGRAPHY, AND JUDICIALLY
CONSTRUCTED RELATIONSHIP TO TITLE IX
A.  Restricting Pornography Under Title VII
Title VII’s prohibition against sexual discrimination includes sexual har-
assment.47 Sexual harassment claims fall into two different categories. Quid pro
quo claims occur when employment benefits are conditioned on sexual favors.
Hostile environment sexual harassment occurs when the work environment is
sexually abusive in nature. It is the latter category that is the focus here.48
The Supreme Court first recognized a Title VII hostile environment sexual
harassment claim in the landmark case of Meritor Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson.49
The Court stated that Congress’ intent in passing Title VII was to eradicate the
“entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment,”50
and that Title VII actions could not be limited to “economic” or “tangible” dis-
crimination.51 The Court adopted the definition of sexual harassment found in
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines, which includes
any “conduct [which] has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with
an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offen-
sive working environment.”52
                                                                                                                                              
Court’s decision in Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), overturned the Rabidue Court’s re-
quirement that the hostile environment create psychological injury to the plaintiff. See id. at 22-32.
Consequently, the de minimis effect may well be sufficient to make out a claim under today’s hostile
environment standard.
46. See Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1481; see also Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp.
1486, 1493-536 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that female welders suffered hostile environment sexual
harassment primarily because pictures of nude and partially nude women appeared throughout the
workplace).
47. See Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
48. See generally Jill Suzanne Miller, Title VII and Title IX: Happy Together as a Resolution to Title
IX Peer Sexual Harassment Claims, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 699 (discussing in more detail the relationship
between Title VII and Title IX and presenting a persuasive argument for including Title VII hostile
environment sexual harassment claims under Title IX).
49. 477 U.S. 57 (1985).
50. Id. at 64, citing Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13
(1978) (quoting Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)).
51. See id.
52. Id. at 65 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a)(3) (1995)). The Court discussed the guidelines of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission which gave examples of workplace conduct that
might be actionable, including “unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature . . . .” Id.
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In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,53 the Supreme Court expanded the hostile
environment sexual harassment claim. First, the Court rejected the requirement
that actionable conduct must have a serious effect on the plaintiff’s psychological
well-being.54 The Court stated that the psychological well-being of the plaintiff
should be considered under the circumstances along with a number of other
factors, none of which was necessarily conclusive.55 Factors such as the severity
and frequency of the conduct, and whether the conduct was physically threat-
ening or merely offensive were to be considered in determining if the alleged
discriminatory behavior created an abusive environment sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of a workplace. If the plaintiff perceived the en-
vironment as hostile and a reasonable person would also perceive it as hostile,
then the behavior creating this environment violated Title VII.56
Today, a claim under Title VII is actionable if: the plaintiff was subjected to
unwelcome harassment on the basis of his or her gender; the alleged harassment
was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment; the
plaintiff found his or her environment abusive and a reasonable person would
find the environment abusive; and the employer knew or should have known of
the behavior.57
Some courts have held that pornography falls into the category of action-
able behavior even where it is not aimed at any one individual or group of indi-
viduals because it has a disparate impact on women.58 Pornography creates a
hostile environment for women who want to deal with their fellow employees
with dignity, free from barriers created by sexual differentiation.59 When por-
nography is displayed in common areas, it conveys the message to many women
that they are welcome in the workplace only if they submit to the sexual stereo-
types that permeate that environment.60 The result is an environment that would
be hostile to a reasonable person who seeks to work with fellow employees with
professionalism.61
B.  The Inclusion of Title VII Coverage by Analogy Under Title IX
Title VII was created to remove barriers which perpetuate stereotypes and a
sense of degradation that limit or close women’s employment opportunities.62
53. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
54. See id. at 22-33, overruling Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
55. See id. at 23. The Court decided that a hostile environment can be determined only by
looking at all the circumstances, including the following factors: 1) the frequency of discriminatory
conduct; 2) the severity of the conduct; 3) whether it was physically threatening or humiliating, or a
mere offensive utterance; 4) whether it unreasonably interfered with an employee’s work perform-
ance. See id. The Court then noted that the psychological well-being of the alleged victim is a rele-
vant factor, but no single factor is required. See id.
56. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1993).
57. See id. at 21.
58. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1523-24 (M.D. Fla.
1991).
59. See Bennet v. Corroon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1988).
60. See Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1524.
61. See id.
62. See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d Cir. 1990).
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Pornography in common areas of the workplace violates Title VII. Title IX states,
“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from par-
ticipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”63
Courts should find that Title IX allows hostile environment claims under univer-
sity conduct codes by analogizing to Title VII. If an educational program or ac-
tivity fails to meet Title IX requirements, then individuals may initiate judicial
review of the program.64 The purpose is to eliminate sex discrimination at aca-
demic institutions. The Supreme Court has already recognized under Title VII
that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination. To completely eradicate
sex discrimination from the educational environment, Title IX should be con-
strued analogously to Title VII to mandate that universities provide grievance
mechanisms for students to bring actions against their peers whose behavior
creates hostile environment sexual harassment.
Some courts have applied Title VII’s hostile environment sexual harassment
by analogy under Title IX for teacher-to-student claims. Most importantly, the
Supreme Court in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public School65 implicitly recog-
nized a private action hostile environment sexual harassment claim against a
school district under Title IX.66 The Court noted that it would not explicitly rule
on the applicability of Title VII by analogy under Title IX because the plaintiff
did not raise the issue on appeal.67 Nevertheless, the Court noted that when a
supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate, the supervisor commits sexual dis-
crimination.68 The Court then concluded that the same rule should apply when a
teacher sexually harasses a student.69
The Franklin decision explicitly recognized a claim for teacher-to-student
hostile environment sexual harassment, and it suggested that the Court would
be willing to recognize student-to-student hostile environment sexual harass-
ment claims under Title IX if the issue were properly brought before it. Some
lower  courts  have  followed  this  interpretation of  the  case.  In Patricia H. v.
Berkeley Unified School District,70 the district court, relying on the Franklin deci-
sion, recognized a claim for teacher-to-student hostile environment sexual har-
assment under Title IX.71
63. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
64. See id. § 1683.
65. 503 U.S. 60 (1992). In this case a female student brought a private action claim under Title
IX against both a former teacher and the school district, alleging that the teacher sexually harassed
her on several occasions and that the school system did not protect her from the discrimination. See
id. at 60-61. The Court held that the student was entitled to damages under Title IX from the indi-
vidual and the school system. See id.
66. In Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993), the district court cited
Franklin to indicate that hostile environment claims do apply under Title IX. See id. at 1563. It noted
that the Supreme Court appeared to recognize the cause of action since there was no quid pro quo
involved in the unlawful conduct. See id. at 1575.
67. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 65, n.4.
68. See id. at 75, citing Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
69. See id.
70. 830 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
71. See id. at 1296-98. The court found that the students were allegedly molested off school
grounds by a band teacher, who taught at a number of schools in the district. See id. at 1294-96.
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The question of whether student-to-student sexual harassment is actionable
under Title IX is still unresolved. In Doe v. Petaluma City School District,72 the dis-
trict court adopted the reasoning of Patricia H. to find a cause of action under
Title IX for student-to-student hostile environment sexual harassment. The
plaintiff’s theory of liability analogized the school district to an employer,
whereby the school district would be liable if it “knew or should have known” of
the sexual harassment of the plaintiff by her peers and failed to take appropriate
remedial action.73 The plaintiff’s school counselor failed to notify her parents of
the school’s Title IX policy or the school official employed to handle Title IX
complaints, even though the plaintiff made repeated complaints to him regard-
ing sexual harassment by her peers.74 The plaintiff claimed that this violated her
federal rights under Title IX and thus gave rise to a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.75
The court refused to apply the plaintiff’s suggested standard of liability to
the school because under Title IX an educational institution’s liability is prem-
ised on intentional, not negligent, discrimination.76 The court denied the plain-
tiff’s claim with leave to amend. It then suggested that a student’s claim might
be actionable if it were brought on the theory that the school’s inaction in the
face of student complaints evidenced the requisite intent to discriminate.77
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit addressed the student’s second amended
complaint, filed after the partial dismissal by the district court.78 In the amended
complaint, the plaintiff asserted a Title IX claim against the school for the coun-
selor’s failure to act.79 The Ninth Circuit noted that the counselor’s alleged inac-
tion occurred prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Franklin.80 Therefore, the
counselor had no clearly established legal duty to intervene in peer sexual har-
assment at the time of his inaction.81 Since the counselor did not have notice that
his inaction was illegal, he was protected under the doctrine of qualified immu-
nity, “which recognizes that officials can act without fear of harassing litigation
only if they reasonably can anticipate when their conduct may give rise [to liti-
72. 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
73. See id. at 1563.
74. See id. at 1564.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states, “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects [any] other person . . . to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured . . . .” Since Title IX gives students a federal right to be free from sex discrimination in
educational institutions receiving federal funding, when such a right is violated by an official or
agency of the state (here a public institution) the individual has a remedy against such official or
agency. See also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (holding that allegedly illegal actions by
city police officers constitute action “under color of state statute” but that only the officers and not
the city were potentially liable, because a municipal corporation is not a person within the meaning
of the statute).
76. See Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1576 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
77. See id.
78. See Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 54 F.3d 1447, 1449 (9th Cir. 1995).
79. See id.
80. See id. at 1451.
81. See id. at 1452; see also Victoria E. Lovato, Doe v. Petaluma City School District: A School
Counselor’s Qualified Immunity, a License to Tolerate Peer Sexual Harassment?, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 381
(criticizing the Ninth Circuit’s failure to punish the counselor’s inaction).
PPOLDENK 12/05/97 3:49 PM
PORNOGRAPHY, THE INTERNET, AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT 169
gation].”82 The Ninth Circuit did surmise the Franklin decision may have created
a legal duty for school personnel to act to prevent peer sexual harassment.83
Therefore, in the future, a claim analogizing school personnel to an employer
and the student to an employee might create a cause of action against a school
for failure to respond properly to hostile environment sexual harassment.84
A year after the Ninth Circuit decision in Petaluma City, the district court in
Oona S. v. Santa Rosa City Schools85 recognized a student’s Title IX right to be free
from sexual harassment by a teacher or fellow students.86 The court found a Title
IX violation when school officials failed to take appropriate steps to deter or
punish peer sexual harassment. The court indicated that the school official’s fail-
ure to respond to the student’s complaints was a form of sex discrimination.87
The limited case law indicates that most courts appear willing to apply Title
VII by analogy to student-to-student hostile environment sexual harassment
claims under Title IX.88 Courts have not yet addressed student-to-student sexual
82. Doe, 54 F.3d at 1452. “Qualified immunity” is an “[a]ffirmative defense which shields public
officials performing discretionary functions from civil damages if their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which reasonable person would have
known;” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 752 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted). The standard for deter-
mining qualified immunity is “[i]f the law at [the time of the official’s actions] was not clearly estab-
lished, an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments,
nor could he fairly be said to ‘know’ that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as un-
lawful.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The plaintiff has the burden of showing that
the law was clearly established at the time of inaction, and “[i]f this burden is met by plaintiff, the
defendant then bears the burden of establishing that his actions were reasonable, even though they
may have violated the plaintiff’s [federally protected rights].” Maraziti v. First Interstate Bank, 953
F.2d 520, 523 (9th Cir. 1992).
83. The Ninth Circuit noted that:
If Homrighouse engaged in the same conduct today, he might not be entitled to qualified
immunity. We would then be required to consider the Supreme Court’s recent Franklin
decision . . . . It might turn out that Title VII cases decided subsequently to the events in
this case could be used by  analogy  to  provide the basis for creating a duty  to act under
Title IX. We express no opinion as to that question.
Doe, 54 F.3d at 1452.
84. See id.
85. 890 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Cal. 1995); see id. at 1469.
86. The district court found the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., 35
F.3d 1396, 1401 (9th Cir. 1994) to imply:
The right created by Title IX may be violated when female students are subjected to sex-
ual harassment by their male peers at a school and school officials discriminate against the
female students on the basis of sex in encouraging or failing to appropriately respond to
such harassment. Such discrimination may manifest itself in the active encouragement of
peer harassment, the toleration of the harassing behavior of male students, or the failure
to take adequate steps to deter or punish peer harassment.
Oona S., 890 F. Supp. at 1469.
87. See Oona S., 890 F. Supp. at 1469; see also Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 458, 460-61 (7th
Cir. 1996) (holding that a student can bring a § 1983 action against school officials and a school dis-
trict for failure to protect the student from harassment and harm by other students due to the stu-
dent’s sexual orientation). In Nabozny, the court found that the student could maintain equal protec-
tion claims alleging discrimination based both on gender and sexual orientation. See id. In addition,
the court found that none of the officials had immunity from their failure to act.
88. See, e.g., Murray v. New York Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 249 (2d Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996) (“[I]n a Title IX suit for gender discrimination based on sexual har-
assment of a student, an educational institution may be held liable under standards similar to those
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harassment claims within a university. The unique nature of the university envi-
ronment89 raises sensitive constitutional questions concerning safeguards for
freedom of expression.90 However, the policy proposed herein is consistent with
existing case law and statutes and is narrowly tailored to fulfill those statutory
purposes.
C.  Is the Inclusion of Title VII Coverage by Analogy Under Title IX Applicable
to Universities?
In the few cases involving sexual harassment in the university setting, Title
VII analyses and doctrine have been applied by analogy under Title IX to stu-
dent claims against  professors or  university employees. In Alexander v. Yale
University,91 students brought an action to compel Yale to install grievance
mechanisms for student sexual harassment claims.92 The students also alleged
that Yale’s failure to provide such mechanisms interfered with their academic
performance and constituted discrimination in education under Title IX.93 The
district court recognized a quid pro quo claim when students’ grades are condi-
tioned on the performance of sexual acts with a professor.94 However, the stu-
dents’ claims were not seen as sufficient to establish quid pro quo harassment
and were dismissed for failure to sufficiently allege the occurrence of sexual
harassment.95 The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the
claims,96 but the court’s discussion of the dismissal implied that if the claims had
not been moot, it would have recognized a hostile environment sexual harass-
ment claim under Title IX.97
Similar claims have arisen in other cases. In Moire v. Temple University
School of Medicine,98 a student serving a psychiatric clerkship alleged sexual har-
assment by university employees.99 The court determined that both quid pro quo
and hostile environment sexual harassment law developed under Title VII were
                                                                                                                                              
applied in cases under Title VII.”). But see Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1016
(5th Cir. 1996) (holding that Title IX does not impose liability on a school district for peer hostile en-
vironment sexual harassment absent a showing that the school district itself, via supervisors, di-
rectly discriminated on the basis of sex); Garaya v. Galena Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 914 F. Supp. 1437,
1438 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (holding that hostile environment claims are not actionable under Title IX).
89. The Supreme Court has noted that “[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is
nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools.” Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
487 (1960).
90. See discussion supra notes 5-18 and accompanying text.
91. 459 F. Supp. 1 (D Conn. 1977), aff’d, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980).
92. See id. at 180.
93. See id. at 181.
94. See id. at 4. In 1980,the time of this case, the sexual harassment doctrine had not yet clearly
recognized hostile environment sexual harassment. Harris v. Forklift clearly delineates it now.
95. See Alexander, 631 F.2d at 185.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 184. The court indicated that because the claims were moot it could neither redress
the injury of “deprivation of an education environment free from condoned harassment,” nor pro-
vide relief by ordering Yale to install “effective procedures for receiving and adjudicating com-
plaints of sexual harassment.” Id. The claims were moot because the students bringing the action
had all been graduated. See id.
98. 613 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
99. See id. at 1362.
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applicable to Title IX claims but found the evidence insufficient to establish ei-
ther claim.100 In Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico,101 a medical student was an
employee of the university and was harassed by fellow employees.102 The court
found that a hostile environment claim could be brought under Title IX.103
The three cases discussed are the only reported decisions involving univer-
sity students and hostile environment sexual harassment. Despite the paucity of
case law addressing hostile environment sexual harassment claims at the univer-
sity level, the Supreme Court’s decision in Franklin and its mandate to give Title
IX’s coverage a scope as broad as its purpose of eradicating sex discrimination in
education104 makes the recognition of student-to-student claims within the uni-
versity context a logical step toward fulfilling the purpose of Title IX.105
IV. HANDLING STUDENT-TO-STUDENT HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL
HARASSMENT CLAIMS WITHIN THE UNIVERSITY CONTEXT
A.  A Proposal for Applying Title VII Standards in the University
If the courts are willing to interpret Title IX to include the rights established
under Title VII, then each university will have to develop a system to protect
students from hostile environment sexual harassment created by their peers.
Under Title IX,106 universities have statutory responsibilities to their students that
are similar to an employer’s responsibilities to its employees under Title VII.
These responsibilities require the university to eradicate all sex discrimination in
the education context.107 Universities should draft provisions into their student
conduct codes to incorporate Title VII hostile environment sexual harassment
law and allow students to bring student-to-student hostile environment claims
when their peers’ behavior unreasonably interferes with their academic per-
formance or otherwise creates a hostile academic environment.108 The student
claimant would be required to meet the elements of an actionable Title VII claim,
with minor modifications.
100. See id. at 1366-67.
101. 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988).
102. See id. at 914; see also Kimberly L. Limbrick, Developing a Viable Cause of Action for Student
Victims of Sexual Harassment: A Look at Medical Schools, 54 MD. L. REV. 601 (discussing the prevalence
of sexual harassment within medical schools).
103. See Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 901.
104. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982).
105. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.1 (1995) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex within educa-
tional institutions); see also Kirsten M. Eriksson What Our Children Are Really Learning in School: Using
Title IX to Combat Peer Sexual Harassment, 83 GEO. L.J. 1799, 1802 (1995) (arguing that the Franklin
decision should be explicitly extended so as to encompass peer sexual harassment under Title IX).
106. 20 U.S.C.  1681-88 (1994).
107. See 34 C.F.R.  106.1 (1995).
108. See Alexandra A. Bodnar, Arming Students for Battle: Amending Title IX to Combat Sexual Har-
assment of Students by Students in Primary and Secondary Schools, 5 S. CAL. REV. L & WOMEN’S STUD.
549, 559 (1996) (noting that studies show that sexual harassment may substantially interfere with a
student’s education; repercussions include low self-esteem and a variety of other psychological,
physical, and academic harms).
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For example, one modification would require that certain incidents of
hostile environment sexual harassment would be actionable only if they oc-
curred within a common area that provided academic services or resources that
facilitate students’ right to an education. The display of pornography on the In-
ternet within the university computer center would be noted within the conduct
code as a kind of behavior which commonly constituted hostile environment
sexual harassment per se. In other words, the display of pornography by itself is
considered inherently injurious, so the plaintiff would not be required to prove
particulars such as actual injury or intent of defendant to harass.
The university, consistent with its responsibilities under the proposed in-
terpretation of Title IX, should do the following: provide notice to all students of
the policy against hostile environment sexual harassment within common areas;
distribute a handbook or other form of notice that indicates the type of physical
or verbal conduct which may qualify as a violation; and develop an effective
grievance procedure to handle student complaints in a prompt and equitable
fashion. Without such efforts by the university, students may have a valid claim
against the university under Title IX for a sexual discrimination suit.109
B.  Common Area Incidents and Student-to-Student Hostile Environment Claims
While one of the purposes of a university is to promote academic freedom,
consisting of the freedom to teach and the freedom to learn, this goal must be
balanced against the university’s responsibility to develop policies and proce-
dures that safeguard this freedom for all students.110 To assure equal access to
educational facilities, universities need to adopt policies to protect students from
pornography that leads to a hostile environment.111 Such policies are based on
responsibility for and sensitivity to others’ needs.112
In this regard, common areas in the university are similar to common areas
within the workplace. Employees are required to use certain common areas,
such as computer rooms, secretarial pools, and office libraries, to fulfill their
work responsibilities. Cafeterias, lounges, and hallways are other common areas.
Students use similar common areas at universities. Computer centers, libraries,
and science laboratories are important facilities on campuses. Other common ar-
eas, including food courts, student unions, and dormitory lounges, are part of
students’ daily routines. General standards of conduct have arguably been es-
tablished for common areas in the workplace,113 and similar standards should be
109. See 20 U.S.C. § 1683 (1994).
110. Sandalow et al., supra note 15, at 24-25.
111. For pornography to result in a hostile environment it must occur within a common area.
This leaves students’ freedom of inquiry untouched, for they are able to view this material in maga-
zines or on their own computers in the privacy of their dorm rooms or in other areas where it does
not infringe upon other students’ freedom to learn.
112. See Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students, 53 AAUP BULL. 365 (1967). The Joint
Statement noted, “The freedom to learn depends upon appropriate opportunities and conditions in
the classroom, on the campus, and in the larger community. Students should exercise their freedom
with responsibility.” Id. at 365-66.
113. See, e.g., Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990) (reviewing
cases and stating that pornography in the workplace could “quite possibly” be regarded as offen-
sive and may be a factor in creating a hostile work environment).
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adopted for common areas at universities to facilitate a productive, welcoming
academic environment for all.
Students should be primarily responsible for maintaining conditions con-
ducive to a productive academic environment. University conduct codes that
establish procedures for student-to-student hostile environment sexual harass-
ment claims would make students responsible for their harassing or offensive
conduct. A student’s free inquiry and expression would only be checked when it
infringed on another student’s freedom to learn. The principle of freedom of ex-
pression with responsibility, enforced by student complaints, would create an
environment where all students could learn free from harassment.
Students’ viewing or reading of pornography within certain common areas
in the university would not create a per se hostile environment, if they exercised
their rights in a responsible manner that would not infringe on other students’
rights to be free from sexual harassment. For example, in the library, a student
could view pictorial pornography or read pornography without creating a per se
hostile environment, so long as he did not intentionally or negligently expose
unwilling viewers to the pornography. For example, if he viewed or read por-
nography while at a desk where another student would have to look hard to see
what he was reading, the viewer would not be negligently or intentionally ex-
posing other students to pornography. The viewer’s behavior would not consti-
tute a violation of the student conduct code because his behavior would not in-
fringe upon the other students’ right to be free from sexual harassment. In
contrast, if the student viewed the pornography in a fashion which caused the
exercise of his right to pervade the area and create a situation in which another
student would have to move to avoid the display, then his behavior would con-
stitute a violation. Thus, if a student looking at a pornographic magazine leaves
it open on a table, holds it up for a friend to see, posts it on the wall, or otherwise
intentionally or negligently displays it to an unwilling viewer, his behavior
would constitute hostile environment sexual harassment.
In certain other common areas, the viewing of pornography would create a
hostile environment per se because a student would not be able to exercise his
right to view pornography without infringing on other students’ right to be free
from sexual harassment. A student’s choice to view pornographic pictures114 on
computer terminals within a university computer center should be acknowl-
edged as an irresponsible exercise of his right. Pornography on the Internet
could pervade the entire computer center and is not easily avoided because of
the typical open layout of such centers. The unwilling viewer should not be
114. This article distinguishes between pictorial and written pornography on computer screens.
The written form of pornography on computer screens does not pervade the environment and a
student cannot know what her classmate is reading without looking closely at his screen. Therefore,
his behavior does not constitute hostile environment sexual harassment per se. However, it may be
proposed that such behavior results in hostile environment sexual harassment if the viewer inten-
tionally or negligently draws attention to what he is viewing, i.e., laughing and joking about it, re-
peating what is written, or otherwise drawing attention to the material he is viewing. Arguably,
when a student decides to view such material, he implicitly assumes the risk that someone will be
exposed to it and become threatened by it. This area has far reaching First Amendment implications,
more appropriately addressed in a separate article. Therefore, I focus only on pictorial pornography
and set aside the issue of written pornography for future discourse.
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forced to bear the burden of avoiding pornography, especially in a facility pro-
vided for academic purposes. The recognition of this behavior as hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment per se preserves other students’ right to learn and,
as subsequently discussed, serves to educate the harasser of behavior that may
lead to negative repercussions within the workplace for which his university
education is preparing him.115
C.  Pornography on Computer Screens Meets Title VII Hostile Environment
Elements
The display of pornography on computer screens within university facili-
ties meets the elements of a hostile environment sexual harassment claim.116 First,
pornography discriminates on the basis of gender because it has a disparate im-
pact on female students.117 Second, pornography creates an abusive environment
because it reminds some female students that some of their male colleagues per-
ceive women as sex objects, not as equals. Finally, unlike written work, a porno-
graphic picture on a computer screen cannot be easily avoided, therefore it is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to unreasonably alter the conditions of a stu-
dent’s academic environment.
Students should be subject to the same protections as employees are under
Title VII. In Meritor Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson,118 the Supreme Court noted
that an employee should not be required to “run the gauntlet of sexual abuse in
return for the privilege of being allowed to work . . . .”119 Thus, an employee does
not have to endure pornographic pictures in the workplace simply because they
are available in magazine stands or convenience stores.120 A person can choose
115. Mitigating circumstances, including the inadvertence of the viewing or the encouragement
or participation of the alleged victim, would be considered during the disciplinary proceedings. The
victim’s silence should not be interpreted as consent, rather it should be seen as evidence of the ef-
fect the actions have upon him or her.
116. First, the plaintiff was subjected to unwelcome harassment on the basis of his or her gender;
second, the alleged harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
employment; and third, the plaintiff found his or her environment abusive and a reasonable person
would find the environment abusive. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22,24-26 (1993).
The fourth element, that the employer knew or should have known of the behavior, does not be-
come applicable unless the university fails to provide proper notice and does not make grievance
procedures available to students. See Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1576 (N.D.
Cal. 1993). This application of the fourth element may not be consistent with some circuits require-
ment that intent be shown. See, e.g., id. However, requiring that intent be shown could make it diffi-
cult for students to hold universities accountable for failing to provide adequate services and proce-
dures to address peer sexual harassment. The universities’ responsibilities under Title IX already
require them to prevent sexual discrimination. Therefore, eliminating the intent requirement applied
under Title VII places no larger responsibility on the universities and, in fact, furthers the purpose of
Title IX.
117. As previously mentioned, all types of pornography should be considered hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. Homosexual pornography
also discriminates on the basis of gender because it makes either male or female students feel like
sexual objects and not professional coequals. It interferes with students’ academic pursuits and can
be just as pervasive and severe as heterosexual pornography.
118. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
119. Id. at 67, quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982).
120. Cf. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that women
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whether or not to enter a magazine stand or store that displays or sells pornog-
raphy, for there are other stores that do not display or sell such materials. In
contrast, both employees and students are required to be certain places within
the employment and university contexts. Additionally, certain common areas in
a workplace and an educational setting are essential to the individual’s effective
performance of his or her endeavors.
In summary, students should also not have to “run the gauntlet of sexual
abuse” to get a college education. More specifically, students should not have to
endure the display of pornographic pictures on the Internet in order to access
university computer resources. A conduct code prohibiting hostile environment
sexual harassment will assist universities in meeting their statutory responsibili-
ties and in removing barriers of sex discrimination.
D.  University Conduct Code Claims Are Consistent with University
Responsibilities Under Title IX Mandates
The purpose of Title IX is to “eliminate . . . discrimination on the basis of
sex in any education program or activity . . . .”121 To further this purpose, Title IX
regulations mandate a number of duties for universities. A university must des-
ignate at least one employee to coordinate efforts toward compliance, including
the investigation of complaints.122 It also must give public notice of its anti-
discrimination policy.123 Additionally, the university has the responsibility not to
“limit any person in the enjoyment of any right, privilege, advantage or oppor-
tunity.”124 The university also must establish grievance procedures to resolve
complaints from both students and employees in a “prompt and equitable”
manner.125
If the university computer center becomes a hostile or frightening environ-
ment for a student because of her peers’ choice to use computers to view porno-
graphic pictures, then her enjoyment of the privilege of using the computer re-
sources is limited. This is analogous to pornography in the workplace which, by
making it more difficult for a woman to do her job, qualifies as sex discrimina-
tion.126 Furthermore, if the university does not have grievance mechanisms for
student-to-student hostile environment sexual harassment claims127 then the uni-
                                                                                                                                              
might feel an offensive atmosphere had been created by the display of pornography in the work-
place, even if men might feel otherwise).
121. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.1 (1995). Title IX covers all educational institutions receiving federal fi-
nancial assistance, including “. . . any institution of vocational, professional, or higher education,
except that in the case of an educational institution composed of more than one school, college, or
department which are administratively separate units, such term means each such school, college,
or department.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(c) (1994).
122. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(a).
123. See id. § 106.9 (stating the notice applies to applicants, parents, students, and union and
professional organizations).
124. Id. § 106.31(b)(7).
125. See id. § 106.8(b).
126. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22, 24-26 (1993).
127. Arguably a student could be charged with hostile environment sexual harassment under
already existing conduct code regulations. The University of Oregon prohibits unwanted sexual be-
havior, described as behavior which “[w]ould materially interfere with the individual’s academic
performance at the University, or participation in University-sponsored or supervised activi-
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versity’s inaction perpetuates a gender-based limitation of the student’s privi-
lege. This result contradicts Title IX’s purpose and opens the university to civil
liability.
A university could fulfill its responsibilities under Title IX by: (1) estab-
lishing and publicizing that the university is strongly opposed to sexual harass-
ment; (2) ensuring that all members of the academic community are given
proper notice of this policy; (3) providing materials which define hostile envi-
ronment, indicating the type of behaviors that may result in a violation of con-
duct codes; (4) establishing grievance procedures to resolve complaints in a
“prompt and equitable” manner;128 and (5) appointing personnel and resources
to ensure that the procedures work efficiently and effectively.
This course of action ensures that the university is engaged in the preven-
tion of hostile environment claims and removes the university from the role of a
disciplinarian. Instead, universities would be facilitating the education and de-
velopment of all students. Students could be given notice of the hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment and other sex discrimination remedies through admis-
sion material, material given to incoming students, freshman lectures, and
university publications. Thus the universities would preserve and promote the
marketplace of ideas recognized by the Supreme Court as essential to academic
freedom.129
The grievance procedures should use corrective education and discipline to
remedy student conduct that is determined to be hostile environment sexual
harassment. Discipline would be appropriate when the incident is egregious, for
example, displaying pornographic pictures of torture, rape, or other violence;
when the action is intentional; or when the action is a repeat offense. Discipline
could include suspension or termination of the privilege to use the university
computer center, fines, suspension or expulsion from school, or other means
commonly used for other student conduct code violations.
Corrective education would be appropriate in all instances and could be
used alone when the viewing is a first time offense done accidentally. Corrective
education could include writing a letter of apology, enrolling in a women’s
                                                                                                                                              
ties . . . .” Oregon Administrative Rule, Student Conduct Code, 571-21-030(10)(b) (1993) (on file with
the Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy).
[This behavior] may be accomplished by words or conduct of a sexual nature that threat-
ens imminent physical harm, endangers the health or safety of any person, or which a rea-
sonable person would know was unwanted and would cause emotional distress. Words conveyed
by telephonic, written, or electronic means shall be included in the definition of “words”
herein.
Id. at (20)(c) (emphasis added). Unfortunately, these regulations cover only student behavior which
is intended and aimed at another student. Additionally, the requirement that the behavior cause
emotional distress imposes a large burden on any complainant for it seems to require proof of in-
jury, emotional or psychological. The conduct codes this paper proposes would classify the display
of pornography on the Internet as hostile environment per se, thus avoiding the difficulty of prov-
ing that the complainant (or female students in general) found the display of pornography suffi-
ciently “outrageous” so as to cause emotional distress.
128. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b).
129. The Supreme Court noted that universities are “peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas’ and no
new constitutional ground [is broken] in reaffirming this Nation’s dedication to safeguarding aca-
demic freedom.” Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972), quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
PPOLDENK 12/05/97 3:49 PM
PORNOGRAPHY, THE INTERNET, AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT 177
studies class or other academic program dealing with gender issues, or volun-
teering at a community center that deals with sexual assault, rape crisis, or
similar issues. When discipline is appropriate, it should be combined with cor-
rective education in order to make offenders aware of why their behavior is un-
acceptable.130
In Title IX, Congress recognized freedom from sexual discrimination in the
academic world to be an important societal interest. University conduct codes
that notify students of behavior that is disruptive and destructive of fellow stu-
dents’ educational environments encourage students to act with decency toward
their peers. If this decency is not displayed, the codes provide a civilized means
of redress for those students harmed by others’ behavior. These conduct codes
would thus further the congressionally recognized national interest of eliminat-
ing sex discrimination in education.131
E.  Further Benefits of Student-to-Student Hostile Environment Claims
Universities provide the appropriate place and the means to create a
change in societal behaviors. In modern society, a college diploma is essential for
the pursuit of most professions. A student attends a university to further his or
her career goals. Businesses and professionals expect universities to educate stu-
dents for the professional world.
University policies that recognize student-to-student hostile environment
sexual harassment would benefit all parties concerned: future employers, male
and female students, and the public in general.132 The policies would benefit fu-
ture employers by training students to be professionals who are aware of the
standards of conduct that govern public and private employment. This would
also benefit students as future professionals by forewarning them of behavior
that is illegal in the employment context. A student would learn rules of behav-
ior in an educational environment and would not have to suffer the harsh costs
and penalties of violating these rules within the workplace.133 Finally, the univer-
sities could fulfill their responsibility not to deny or limit a student’s enjoyment
of his or her rights and privileges on the basis of gender134 while still preserving
the “marketplace of ideas” in its educational capacity.
130. See Letter from Barbara L. Krause, Judicial Administrator, Cornell University, to the Cornell
Community and Other Interested Persons (Nov. 17, 1995) (on file with the Duke Journal of Gender
Law & Policy). This letter discusses an e-mail that was sent out describing 75 reasons why women
should not have freedom of speech. See id. at 1. The students apparently apologized voluntarily after
being made aware of the hurt and anger they caused their colleagues within the Cornell community.
See id. This was done even though the students were found not to have violated the student conduct
codes. See id.
131. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.1.c
132. “Men don’t wake up when they are 21 and start sexually harassing women in the work-
place. It is a learned behavior.” Susan McGee Bailey, Director, Wellesley College Center for Research
on Women, quoted in Elizabeth Mehren, Sexual Harassment Shows Up at School, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 25,
1993, at E5.
133. An employer’s response to an employee that engaged in behavior violative of Title VII may
include firing, refusal to promote, or general discontent. This could affect a person’s future career
path. Comparatively, a student who violates conduct codes may receive sanctions that are less dras-
tic.
134. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.31(b)(7).
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By making students responsible for bringing claims of sexual harassment,
the students’ right to learn and their right to free expression is equitably bal-
anced. This removes the role of initiating enforcement from the university offi-
cials’ hands while still ensuring that a student whose right to learn is adversely
affected has an effective means of recourse. This procedure would mirror the
professional world where individuals are responsible for bringing claims of dis-
crimination. Consequently, university practices benefit the professional world.135
University conduct codes that provide mechanisms for student-to-student
hostile environment sexual harassment claims represent a compromise between
the many rights and freedoms of an academic environment and the coterminous
responsibilities which must accompany them to avoid chaos and injury. Some
universities have recognized the value of addressing hurtful and socially detri-
mental behaviors like sexual harassment; other universities defend students’ free
speech as essential to academic freedom, so they protect pornographic speech
regardless of its possibly negative repercussions.136 The former run the risk of
being found to unconstitutionally restrict freedom of expression. The latter risk
allowing sex discrimination to persist and being found liable under Title IX.
Academia is lauded for its preservation of students’ free expression. The
promotion of the free exchange of ideas and opinions is seen as essential to the
pursuit of truth. Unfortunately, certain forms of expression serve to lock out
some groups from the free market of ideas. The consequence of a university’s
blind devotion to free speech as being essential to academic freedom is that it
deprives groups often already excluded from academic discourse of a meaning-
ful response to “speech” that makes their educational environment hostile or of-
fensive. These groups are silenced and consequently, the richness and diversity
of the academic dialogue is decreased rather than increased.137 What is created is
only one version of the truth. If we continue to hold as inviolable the free expres-
sion of all and any ideas in any setting in an academic context, then “we see
135. See Elizabeth T. Kennan, The Moral Functions of Higher Education in Modern Society, 20 J.C. &
U.L. 69, 69-70 (1993). Universities will be more highly regarded by the public and professional
worlds by properly educating students about appropriate codes of behavior accepted in the em-
ployment context. The university was once seen as a tool to develop the moral commitment of
youth. This role has nearly disappeared in the eyes of society, for it now doubts that truthfulness
and “good” are taught at the university. See id. at 70. Yet, it is argued, and I believe, that the univer-
sity is the forum for resolving the raging conflicts between groups of people which arise when one
group exercises rights without respect for the rights of others. See id. at 73. The university can help
us recognize our common interest in cooperation and obtain a fundamental decency in our regard
for each other. Id.
136. See Letter from Barbara L. Krause, supra note 130, at 1-2 (stating that Cornell University be-
lieves student dialogue will educate those students who say things that are hurtful to others and
that those students, respecting the feelings of their peers, will stop).
137. See On Freedom of Expression and Campus Speech Codes, 78 ACADEME: BULL. OF THE AM.
ASSOC. OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, No. 4, 30-31, (1992) (finding that some messages victimize some indi-
viduals and groups causing “fears, tensions and conflicts” creating an environment “inimical to
learning,” and that negative implications would fall both to minority and majority groups’ mem-
bers). However, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) has maintained its de-
votion to preserving freedom of expression no matter how repugnant the ideas. See id. There has
been no definitive response to computer pornography, however, the AAUP is likely to find educa-
tion and dialogue the most effective response to this freedom of expression problem.
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melancholy effects resulting from establishments which in theory promise none
but happy results.”138
Pornography has been recognized to have an adverse impact on women. It
silences them, runs them out of jobs, and removes important opportunities. As
previously discussed, the First Amendment protects pornography as a form of
freedom of expression, however, the First Amendment status of pornography
will not create a barrier to the university grievance mechanisms proposed here.139
Free speech would be only slightly limited in comparison to the harm that
would be prevented. The possibility that a student may be punished for viewing
pornography in the university computer center creates a minor limitation upon
students’ freedom of expression. This cost is insignificant and the benefit is large:
it removes barriers to many students’ freedom to learn. Additionally, it furthers
the national interest in removing sex-discrimination from all educational con-
texts.
V.  CONCLUSION
The adoption of Title VII standards concerning hostile environment sexual
harassment by analogy under Title IX within the university context is necessary
to effectuate the purpose of Title IX. The recognition of student-to-student claims
138. CHARLES E. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 169 (1978) (quoting Gustave
De Beaumont and Alexis De Tocqueville).
139. While the details of the First Amendment restrictions on limits to free speech would require
a separate article, what follows is a summary of the applicable law. The Supreme Court has created
what is referred to as the constitutionally acceptable “time, place and manner” requirement to re-
strict speech. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63 n.18 (1976). The “time, place
and manner” requirement demands that the regulation be “content-neutral,” serve a substantial
government interest, and be narrowly tailored so as not to unreasonably restrict alternative avenues
of communication. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293-94 (1985).
The Supreme Court has found that zoning ordinances that restrict the location of adult-
entertainment businesses fall under the “time, place and manner” test. See Young, 427 U.S. at 62-63.
Zoning ordinances were not found to be “content-based” regulations, which restrain free speech on
the basis  of its content and  presumptively  violate the First Amendment. See City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986). The Supreme Court justifies its review of such policies
as “content-neutral” when evidence exists that a “predominate intent” of the legislature in passing
regulations was not restricting the content of the materials produced by the adult-entertainment
businesses, but rather at the secondary effects such businesses have upon neighborhoods. See id. at
49. The Supreme Court’s review then focuses on whether the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve
substantial governmental interest, and whether it unreasonably restricts other avenues of communi-
cation. See id. The Supreme Court has recognized the preservation of the quality of a neighborhood
as “one that must be accorded high respect.” Id. Therefore courts commonly find that the govern-
ment furthers a substantial interest when it promulgates regulations restricting adult-entertainment
businesses.
University conduct codes allowing for student-to-student actions for hostile environment
sexual harassment created by fellow students’ use of the Internet to view pornography in university
computer facilities would meet the “time, place and manner” test for a constitutionally acceptable
regulation of freedom of expression. University conduct codes are not aimed at the content of the
pornography, rather, the “predominate intent” of the codes is to remove sex discrimination in the
form of hostile environment sexual harassment from the educational environment. This purpose
clearly furthers the substantial governmental interest of eradicating sex discrimination from the
educational environment (as recognized by Title IX). Finally, the conduct codes are narrowly tai-
lored to cover only common areas in a university and do not restrict students ability to gain access
to pornography through other avenues of communication.
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for hostile environment sexual harassment under university conduct codes and
disciplinary procedures is the most practical and effective means of recognizing
and combating hostile environment sexual harassment within the universities.
The conduct codes allow students to preserve their academic freedoms while
teaching them to exercise those freedoms with responsibility. The conduct codes
represent a compromise with minor concessions by each side—the students of-
fended by pornography and the students who view it as free speech.
The long established regard given to the market place of ideas within the
university context should not be a barrier to the implementation of student-to-
student hostile environment sexual harassment claims, though it does give
pause for thought. The benefits of success will be significant for all concerned—
the students, the universities, and the professional world.
